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Secure	  SQL	  Server	  –	  Enabling	  Secure	  
Access	  to	  Remote	  Relational	  Data	  
The	   Secure	   SQL	   Server	   –	   SecSS,	   is	   a	   technology	   primarily	   developed	   to	   enable	  self-­‐service	   governance	   of	   states,	   as	   described	   in	   (Paulin	   2012).	   Self-­‐service	  governance	   is	   a	   novel	   model	   of	   governance	   that	   rejects	   service-­‐based	   public	  administration	  and	   instead	  proposes	  that	  governed	  subjects	  manage	  their	   legal	  relations	  in	  a	  self-­‐service	  manner,	  based	  on	  ad-­‐hoc	  determination	  of	  eligibilities.	  In	   this	  article	  we	  describe	   the	  prototype	  SecSS	  and	   its	  evaluation	   in	  a	   complex	  governmental	  scenario.	  
1 Introduction	  Our	  general	  research	  follows	  the	  ideological	  goal	  of	  designing	  a	  society	  that	  does	  not	   need	   human-­‐managed	   bureaucracy	   for	   governance.	   In	   (Paulin	   2012)	   we	  argue	  that	  governing	  states	  and	  other	  forms	  of	  human	  societies	  can	  be	  managed	  by	  the	  citizens/subjects	  themselves,	  with	  no	  need	  for	  bureaucratic	  intervention.	  In	  order	  to	  achieve	  self-­‐service	  governance	  (ss-­‐Gov),	  it	  is	  essential	  to	  focus	  on	  the	  cornerstones	   of	   governed	   societies,	   whereby	   the	   essential	   information	   needed	  for	   governance	   is	   –	   besides	   the	   identities	   of	   the	   governed	   subjects,	   knowledge	  about	   legal	   relations	  between	  members	  of	   the	  particular	   society.	  Provided	   that	  such	  information	  is	  available	   in	  form	  of	  discreet	   information	  within	  distributed	  information	  systems,	  individual	  eligibilities	  to	  do	  or	  obtain	  something	  in	  a	  given	  context	   can	   be	   determined	   algorithmically,	   which	   consequently	   eliminates	   the	  need	  for	  manual	  evaluation	  of	  given	  eligibilities.	  
	  
Figure	  1:	  The	  principles	  and	  stakeholders	  of	  ss-­‐Gov	  In	   ss-­‐Gov,	   data	   required	   for	   governing	   must	   be	   stored	   in	   databases,	   to	   which	  subjects	   have	   read	   and	   write	   access.	   Trough	   self-­‐service	   manipulation	   of	   the	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stored	  data,	  subjects	  themselves	  manage	  their	  legal	  relations	  and	  rights,	  thus	  for	  example	   somebody	   can	   gain	   the	   right	   to	   drive	   cars	   or	   the	   eligibility	   to	   receive	  child	   support	   (cf.	   the	   examples	   in	   Paulin	   2012).	   Eligibilities	   in	   ss-­‐Gov	   are	   not	  stored,	  but	  calculated	  ad-­‐hoc	  and	  are	  based	  on	  live	  data	  –	  the	  later	  being	  crucial	  for	  the	  existence	  of	  eligibilities.	  Distributed	  databases	  (“registries”)	  and	  the	   interaction	  with	  them	  are	  essential	  for	  ss-­‐Gov	  –	  not	  only	  from	  the	  organizational,	  but	  also	  from	  the	  legal	  perspective.	  In	   order	   to	   comply	   with	   basic	   legal	   principles,	   most	   notably	   the	   principle	   of	  legality,	  six	  requirements	  have	  been	  defined	  that	  any	  ss-­‐Gov	  system	  must	  fulfill	  (Paulin	   2012,	   2.2.1):	   The	   system	   must	   legally	   define	   (1)	   the	   interface	   of	   the	  system	  on	  the	  Internet	  –	  e.g.	  URI,	  (2)	  the	  formats	  of	  the	  exchanged	  messages	  and	  (3)	  the	  procedure	  how	  messages	  will	  be	  handled.	  Further	  such	  system	  (4)	  must	  accept	   arbitrary	   requests	   in	   a	   standardized	   artificial	   language,	   (5)	   must	  guarantee	  legally	  significant	  communication	  and	  (6)	  must	  allow	  direct	  access	  to	  core	  data	  restricted	  only	  by	  legal	  requirements.	  Furthermore,	   ss-­‐Gov	  knows	  six	   stakeholders	   (Paulin	  2012,	  2.2.3),	  whose	  needs	  must	  be	   satisfied:	   (i)	  politicians,	  who	  make	  descriptive	   legislation,	   (ii)	   officials,	  who	  translate	  legislation	  into	  a	  system	  of	  databases,	  data	  and	  rules	  of	  access	  to	  this	   data,	   (iii)	   judges,	   who	   resolve	   disputes	   in	   case	   that	   legislation	   was	   not	  correctly	   translated	   by	   the	   officials,	   (iv)	   administrators	   who	   maintain	   the	  integrity	  of	  the	  ss-­‐Gov	  systems,	  (v)	  subjects,	  who	  access	  the	  data	  and	  (vi)	  service	  providers,	   who	   offer	   products	   –	   e.g.	   graphic	   user	   interfaces,	   programming	  libraries	   or	   notary	   services,	   to	   facilitate	   the	  manipulation	  with	   ss-­‐Gov	  data	   for	  the	  subjects.	  In	   the	  present	  article	  we	  aim	  to	  describe	  how	  such	  a	  registry	  could	  be	  realized	  using	   currently	   available	   technology,	   whereby	   our	   utmost	   priority	   shall	   be	   to	  fulfill	  the	  six	  technical	  requirements	  and	  satisfy	  the	  six	  stakeholder	  types	  stated	  above.	  We	   shall	   therefore	   find	   suitable	   technologies	   for	   storing	   and	   accessing	  data	  as	  well	  as	  for	  optimal	  enforcement	  of	  access-­‐restrictions.	  In	  order	  to	  prove	  the	   feasibility	   of	   the	   chosen	   technologies,	  we	   shall	   present	   a	   prototype	   ss-­‐Gov	  system.	  	  We	  chose	  the	  design	  science	  methodology	  (March	  and	  Smith	  1995;	  Hevner	  et	  al.	  2004)	   for	   the	  presented	   research,	   considering	   the	   guidelines	  by	  Roel	  Wieringa	  (2009).	  Wieringa	  puts	  emphasis	  on	   the	  regulative	  cycle	   as	  a	   framework	   for	   the	  logic	   of	   practical	   problem	   solving,	   whereby	   this	   cycle	   consists	   of	   four	   phases:	  problem	   investigation,	   solution	   design,	   design	   validation	   and	   the	   optional	  solution	  implementation.	  	  The	  research	  presented	  in	  this	  paper	  follows	  the	  goal	  to	  construct	  the	  concrete	  ss-­‐Gov	  prototype,	  which	   is	   the	   first	  system	  instantiating	  ss-­‐Gov	  and	  thus	  out	  of	  competition	  (the	  feasibility	  of	  ss-­‐Gov	  as	  such	  has	  been	  demonstrated	  in	  (Paulin	  2012)).	  According	   to	  Wieringa	  (2009),	  a	  design	  solution/artifact	   is	  successfully	  validated,	   if	   it	   meets	   the	   criterion	   of	   internal	   validity,	   i.e.	   if	   the	   effect	   of	   the	  solution	  would	  satisfy	  stakeholder	  criteria,	  which	  are	  to	  be	  elaborated	  trough	  the	  problem	  definition.	  In	  our	  case	  the	  solution	  must	  meet	  both	  the	  requirements	  of	  the	   six	   stakeholder	   roles,	   as	  well	   as	   the	   six	   requirements	   for	   ss-­‐Gov	   registries	  summarized	   hereinabove.	   Designing	   an	   adequate	   solution	   is	   further	   bound	   to	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several	  important	  technology-­‐related	  knowledge	  questions	  (cf.	  Wieringa	  2009,	  2),	  which	   we	   have	   to	   resolve	   beforehand,	   such	   as	   which	   technologies	   to	   use	   for	  identifying	   subjects,	   for	   querying	   and	   communicating	   data,	   and	   how	   to	   define	  and	  apply	  restrictions	  of	  access.	  	  We	   further	  define	  stakeholder	  needs	  and	  discuss	   the	   technological	  alternatives	  in	   chapter	   2	   and	   justify	   our	   decisions.	   In	   chapter	   3	   we	   describe	   the	   designed	  solution	   –	   the	   Secure	   SQL	   Server	   and	   evaluate	   it	   finally	   in	   chapter	   4	   using	   a	  scenario	  of	  governing	  children	  playing	  in	  a	  sandbox.	  	  
2 Stakeholder	  needs	  &	  technologies	  	  SS-­‐Gov	  defines	  six	  stakeholder	  roles,	  as	  illustrated	  in	  Figure	  1,	  however	  only	  two	  of	   them	  are	  relevant	   for	  designing	   the	  ss-­‐Gov	  registry,	  namely	   the	  officials	  and	  the	   subjects.	   Politicians	   are	   not	   relevant	   for	   the	   design,	   because	   they	   only	  generate	  rules	  that	  must	  be	  translated	  by	  the	  officials	  into	  digital	  form.	  It	  is	  the	  later	   that	  must	  deal	  with	   the	  standards	  and	  semantics	  of	   the	   technical	  solution	  and	   it	   is	  also	   the	  officials	   that	   take	  responsibility	   for	   their	   translation.	  Also	   the	  role	   of	   administrators	   is	   not	   important	   from	   the	  design	  point	   of	   view,	   as	   their	  only	   task	   is	   to	  provide	   the	   integrity	  of	   the	  system,	  without	   interfering	  with	   the	  data.	  	  Service	  providers	  do	  not	  play	  an	  active	  role,	  however	  their	  existence	  implies	  the	  requirement	   for	  proxy	  access	   to	  data,	   i.e.	  access	  on	  behalf	  of	  subjects.	  Thus	   for	  example,	   a	   notary	   acting	   as	   a	   service	   provider	   could	   commit	   a	   real-­‐estate	  transaction	  on	  behalf	  of	  her	  client,	  whereby	  the	  respective	  ss-­‐Gov	  registry	  would	  receive	  the	  request	  for	  data	  manipulation	  from	  the	  notary	  instead	  of	  the	  owner	  of	   the	   real	   estate.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   power	   given	   to	   somebody	   for	  representation	  either	  explicitly	  or	  by	  law	  (e.g.	  parents	  representing	  children)	  is	  only	   information	   that	   must	   be	   determinable	   by	   ss-­‐Gov	   trough	   dedicated	  registries	  and	  regulated	  by	  law.	  Hence,	  also	  the	  role	  of	  service	  providers	  does	  not	  impose	  any	  requirements	  on	  the	  design	  that	  would	  not	  be	  already	  expressed	  by	  the	  six	  technical	  &	  legal	  requirements.	  Subjects	  use	  ss-­‐Gov	  to	  manipulate	  data	  based	  upon	  which	  concrete	  eligibilities	  in	  a	  given	  context	  are	  determined.	  Any	  request	  received	  by	  an	  ss-­‐Gov	  registry	  must	  therefore	  be	  a	  non-­‐repudiable	  expression	  of	  will	  of	   its	   sender	  and	   the	  sender’s	  identity	  must	  be	  revealed	  to	  the	  registry.	  This	  implies	  the	  requirement	  of	  using	  an	   electronic	   ID	   (e-­‐ID)	   and	   electronic	   signature	   to	   assure	   non-­‐repudiation	   of	  origin	  in	  any	  communication	  with	  ss-­‐Gov.	  Two	   questions	   need	   to	   be	   answered	   so	   far:	   which	   technology	   shall	   we	   use	   to	  identify	  users	  and	  assure	  non-­‐repudiable	  messages?	  And:	  which	  technology	  shall	  be	  used	  to	  store	  the	  data	  so	  that	  an	  arbitrary	  read-­‐write	  access	  restrained	  only	  by	  electronic	  rules	  can	  be	  provided?	  In	  the	  next	  two	  subchapters,	  we	  shall	   find	  first	  the	  answer	  to	  the	  later	  question	  and	  then	  to	  the	  former.	  
2.1 Managing	  read-­‐write	  access	  to	  data	  Relational	   databases	   (Codd	   1970)	   are	   the	   dominant	   structure	   for	   storing	   data	  inside	   information	   systems	   today	   (cf.	   Bain	   2009).	   From	   the	   perspective	   of	   the	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present	   research	   it	   is	  of	  no	   importance	  how	   the	  data	   is	   represented	   inside	   the	  databases;	  what	  is	  important	  however	  is	  that	  data	  from	  such	  databases	  is	  usually	  accessed	   trough	   relational	   database	   management	   systems	   (RDBMS)	   using	   the	  standardized	  query	  language	  SQL	  (Chamberlin	  and	  Boyce	  1974;	  ISO/IEC	  9075-­‐1	  2008).	  	  Trough	  SQL,	  data	  structures	  are	  defined,	  created,	  manipulated	  and	  queried	  using	  relational	  algebra;	  SQL	  can	  be	  used	  to	  read	  and	  write	  data,	  as	  well	  as	  to	  perform	  complex	   queries	   to	   filter	   and	   combine	   sets	   of	   data,	   etc.	   Because	   the	   relational	  data	   model	   does	   not	   imply	   how	   data	   is	   stored	   physically	   in	   the	   system,	   SQL	  remains	  platform	  and	  vendor	  independent.	  There	  are	  no	  explicit	  means	  to	  regulate	  access	  to	  data	  provided	  by	  SQL	  as	  such.	  Vendors	   of	   RDBMSs	   implement	   their	   own	   solutions,	   which	   often	   result	   in	   the	  management	  of	  access	  privileges	  for	  various	  users,	  whereby	  such	  privileges	  are	  restricted	  only	  to	  the	  level	  of	  schemas	  (“databases”)	  and	  relations	  (“tables”)1.	  	  More	  detailed	  rules	  for	  managing	  the	  access	  to	  data	  are	  usually	  hardcoded	  in	  the	  business	  logic	  of	  the	  front-­‐end	  applications.	  However,	  as	  argued	  in	  (Paulin	  2012,	  1.2),	   hardcoded	   rules	   are	   no	   sustainable	   solution	   for	   governing	   and	   must	  therefore	  be	  avoided	  if	  possible.	  	  This	  requirement	  factually	  means	  that	  a	  way	  must	  be	  found	  how	  fixed	  business	  logic	   can	   apply	   frequently	   changing	   and	   not-­‐known-­‐in-­‐advance	   rules	   to	   not-­‐known-­‐in-­‐advance	   request.	   Provided	   that	   requests	   are	   in	   SQL,	   it	   is	   possible	   to	  express	   access	   restrictions	   in	   form	   of	   subsets	   of	   data	   to	   which	   the	   requester	  would	   have	   unlimited	   access.	   SQL	   allows	   calling	   a	   query	   against	   sub-­‐queries,	  whereby	  first	  each	  sub-­‐query	  is	  executed,	  resulting	  in	  a	  virtual	  relation;	  the	  outer	  query	   is	   then	   executed	   against	   such	   virtual	   relation.	   As	   this	   technique	   was	  applied	  also	  for	  the	  SecSS,	  it	  will	  be	  described	  in	  more	  detail	  in	  chapter	  3.	  SQL	  would	  therefore	  be	  a	  feasible	  option	  that	  would	  satisfy	  both	  requirement	  #4	  (arbitrary	  requests	  in	  standardized	  language)	  and	  #6	  (access	  to	  core	  data	  limited	  only	  by	  law).	  An	   alternative	   technology	   is	   the	  Resource	  Description	  Framework	   (RDF),	  which	  plays	   an	   important	   role	   in	   the	   Linked/Open	   Data	   movements	   (cf.	   Veljković,	  Bogdanović-­‐Dinić,	  and	  Stoimenov	  2011)	  and	  the	  Semantic	  Web	  (Berners-­‐Lee	  et	  al.	   2001;	   cf.	   Vitvar,	   Peristeras,	   and	   Tarabanis	   2010).	   RDF	   is	   a	   syntax-­‐neutral	  framework	   for	   storing	   data	   in	   subject-­‐predicate-­‐object	   triples,	   whereby	   the	  
subject	  denotes	  the	  described	  resource,	  the	  predicate	  its	  attribute	  and	  the	  object	  its	  value.	  Various	  syntaxes	  for	  expressing	  and	  communicating	  RDF	  exist,	  such	  as	  RDF+XML,	   N3	   (Berners-­‐Lee	   et	   al.	   2008)	   or	   Turtle	   (Beckett	   and	   Berners-­‐Lee	  2008).	  	  Berners-­‐Lee	  (2009)	  sees	  RDF	  as	  an	  essential	   technology	   for	  publishing	  data	  on	  the	  Web	   in	  a	  way	   that	  would	  allow	   intelligent	   reuse	  and	   integration	  of	   remote	  sources	   of	   data,	   which	   would	   result	   in	   the	   Semantic	   web.	   However,	   as	   Patel-­‐Schneider	   (2010)	   points	   out,	   RDF	   was	   designed	   to	   contain	   structure,	   not	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  Cf.	  the	  user	  management	  of	  MySQL,	  MSSQL,	  Oracle,	  etc.	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semantics;	   the	   later	   being	   introduced	   around	   2004.	   (The	   semantic	   aspects	   of	  RDF	   are	   for	   ss-­‐Gov	   not	   relevant.	   The	   semantics	   of	   data	   stored	   in	   ss-­‐Gov	   are	  defined	  and	  determined	  by	  law,	  thus	  there	  is	  no	  need	  for	  meta-­‐data	  representing	  semantics	  or	  such	  kind.)	  	  RDF	  is	  a	  model	  that	  bases	  on	  the	  graph	  theory	  (cf.	  Hayes	  and	  Gutierrez	  2004;	  cf.	  Berners-­‐Lee	   1998)	   and	   is	   thus	   in	   sharp	   contrast	   to	   the	   relational	   model.	  Although	  RDF	  was	  not	  designed	  as	  a	  database	  technology,	  but	  only	  as	  a	  model	  to	  represent	  data,	  we	  might	   consider	   the	  use	  of	   triple-­‐stores,	   i.e.	   dedicated	  graph	  databases	  for	  storing	  RDF.	  Graph	  databases	  are	  not	  new	  and	  they	  are	  known	  for	  achieving	  better	  performance	   than	   relational	  databases	  and	   therefore	  are	  used	  for	  high	  load	  scenarios	  by	  global	  enterprises	  like	  Google,	  Facebook,	  LinkedIn	  or	  Amazon	  (Vicknair	  et	  al.	  2010).	  	  Graph	   databases	   in	   comparison	   to	   relational	   databases	   lack	   a	   common	   query	  language.	  Thus,	  Angles	  &	  Gutierrez	   (2005)	   list	   a	  wide	  assortment	  of	   languages	  used	   to	   retrieve	   data	   from	   graph	   databases:	   G+,	   GraphLog,	   Gram,	   PaMal,	  GraphDB,	   Lorel,	   plus	   rivaling	   languages	   dedicated	   for	   querying	   RDF:	   RQL,	  SquishQL,	  RDQL,	  RDFQL,	  TRIPLE,	  Versa,	  SeRQL,	  RXPath.	  	  In	   2004	   the	   SPARQL	   query	   language	   for	   RDF	   appeared,	  which	   since	   2008	   is	   a	  W3C	   recommendation.	   Although	   originally	   only	   a	   language	   for	   read-­‐querying	  data,	  SPARQL	  later	  received	  the	  amendment	  SPARQL-­‐Update,	  which	  allows	  write	  access	  to	  RDF	  data	  (Seaborne	  et	  al.	  2008).	  Both	  SQL	  and	  SPARQL	  have	  similar	  characteristics	  and	  allow	  read/write	  access	  to	   data,	   as	   well	   as	   sub-­‐queries.	   While	   the	   former	   has	   been	   an	   established	  technology	   for	   several	   decades,	   the	   later	   was	   designed	   with	   the	   distributed	  architecture	   of	   the	  Web	   in	  mind.	  However,	  while	   in	   theory	   both	   options	   seem	  equally	   feasible,	  we	  chose	  SQL,	   as	   it	   is	   a	  mature,	   standardized	   technology	  with	  undisputed	  market	  dominance.	  
2.2 Identification	  and	  authorization	  For	  each	  message	  (both	  request	  and	  reply)	   transmitted	   in	  ss-­‐Gov	   it	   is	  essential	  that	   the	   receiver	   can	   be	   sure	   that	   the	  message	   is	   non-­‐repudiable;	   further,	   the	  rules	  to	  be	  applied	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  requester’s	  identity	  in	  order	  to	  provide	  a	  personalized	  authorization	  of	  access	  –	  it	  is	  therefore	  essential	  that	  the	  identity	  is	  a	  non-­‐repudiable	  part	  of	  each	  message.	  We	   considered	   a	   number	   of	   technologies	   used	   for	   identification	   and	  authorization:	  first	  to	  mention	  are	  various	  single-­‐sign-­‐on	  (SSO)	  technologies	  that	  allow	   users	   to	   identify	   themselves	   to	   heterogeneous	   servers	   using	   a	   single	  identity.	   David	   et	   al.	   (2011)	   list	   Kerberos,	   OpenID	   and	   Snap2Pass	   as	   notable	  options	  for	  SSO.	  Kerberos	  (S.	  P.	  Miller	  et	  al.	  1987)	  is	  one	  of	  the	  first	  SSO	  protocols	  for	  authorizing	  access	   to	   remote	   services	   in	   a	   network.	   Its	   core	   architecture	   uses	   two	   tightly	  synchronized	  servers,	  the	  authentication	  server	  that	  authenticates	  the	  identity	  of	  the	   client,	   and	   the	   “ticket	   granting	   server”	   that	   issues	   time-­‐limited	   tokens	  (“tickets”)	  for	  accessing	  services.	  David	  et	  al.	  (2011)	  note	  that	  the	  protocol	  is	  not	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only	  highly	  complex	  but	  from	  today’s	  perspective	  also	  not	  adequately	  secure	  any	  more.	  OpenID	  (cf.	  Recordon	  and	  Reed	  2006)	  is	  an	  open	  standard	  for	  SSO	  over	  the	  Web.	  It	  does	  not	  depend	  on	  a	  central	  authority	  that	  would	  issue	  identities,	  thus	  users	  can	   choose	   from	   various	   identity-­‐providers.	   The	   individual	   authentication	  towards	   the	   identity-­‐providers	   can	   require	   the	   user	   to	   enter	   a	   basic	  username/password	   combination,	   but	   also	   advanced	   biometric	   and	   smartcard	  authentication	   are	   possible.	   After	   authenticating	   the	   user,	   the	   server	   issues	   a	  Yadis	   (J.	  Miller	   2006)	   document,	  which	   is	   then	   used	   for	   identification	   towards	  applications.	   OpenID	   is	   significant	   because	   of	   its	   popularity	   and	   it	   is	   used	   by	  Google,	  Yahoo,	  MySpace,	  AOL,	  PayPal,	  VeriSign,	  etc.	  However,	  OpenID	  is	  neither	  designed	   to	   provide	   message	   integrity	   nor	   the	   non-­‐repudiation	   of	   its	   content,	  thus	  ss-­‐Gov	  requirement	  #5	  is	  not	  met.	  Also	  Snap2Pass	  is	  not	  suitable	  due	  to	  the	  same	  reason.	  Snap2Pass	  (Dodson	  et	  al.	  2010)	   is	   a	   protocol	   that	   authenticates	   the	   user	   by	   presenting	   her	   a	   randomly	  generated	  QR	  code	  which	  the	  user	  must	  capture	  by	  her	  mobile	  device	  on	  which	  a	  shared	  secret	  is	  stored.	  Using	  that	  shared	  secret	  and	  the	  unique	  token	  received	  by	  capturing	  the	  QR	  code	  a	  hash-­‐based	  message	  authentication	  code	  (HMAC)	  is	  generated	  and	  returned	  to	  the	  server.	  In	   another	   survey	  Akram	  &	  Hoffmann	   (2008)	   consider	   also	   the	   aspect	   of	   non-­‐repudiation	   when	   evaluating	   six	   popular	   technologies	   –	   SAML,	   OpenID,	  CardSpace,	   Shiboleth,	   Higgins	   and	   Liberty,	   however	   they	   find	   only	   Higgins	  capable	   to	   adequately	   provide	   this	   feature.	   Higgins	   was	   also	   the	   best	  recommendation	  for	  user-­‐centric	  identity	  management	  in	  a	  survey	  conducted	  by	  Maliki	  &	  Seigneur	  (2007).	  The	   broad	   assortment	   of	   available	   and	   constantly	   evolving	   technologies	   for	  identity	   management	   (cf.	   Lampropoulos	   and	   Denazis	   2011)	   motivates	   us	   to	  chose	   conservatively	   rather	   than	   progressively.	  We	   chose	   the	  well-­‐established	  X.509	  ITU	  standard	  and	  the	  PKI	  infrastructure	  for	  identity	  management.	  	  The	  X.509	  standard	  provides	  the	  concept	  of	  digital	  certificates	  that	  are	  issued	  by	  the	   identity	   provider,	   which	   should	   be	   a	   trusted	   third	   party	   (TTP).	   Each	  certificate	  is	  digitally	  signed	  by	  its	  issuer	  and	  usually	  contains	  a	  public	  key,	  which	  corresponds	   to	   a	   private	   key	   known	   only	   by	   the	   owner	   of	   the	   certificate,	   thus	  enabling	  the	  owner	  to	  digitally	  sign	  and	  encrypt	  communication.	  Under	  certain	  conditions,	   digital	   signatures	   are	  non-­‐repudiable	   and	  enjoy	   the	   same	  power	  as	  their	  traditional,	  handwritten	  counterparts	  (cf.	  Blythe	  2005).	  
3 SecSS	  The	   Secure	   SQL	   Server	   (SecSS)	   prototype	   is	   a	   Web	   application	   built	   using	  Microsoft	   .NET	   4.0	  WCF	   technology	   (cf.	  Mackey	   2010).	   SecSS	   acts	   as	   a	   neutral	  agent	  that	  receives	  requests	  for	  querying	  data,	  expressed	  as	  digitally	  signed	  SQL	  queries.	   After	   receiving	   a	   query,	   SecSS	   verifies	   its	   integrity	   and	   extracts	   the	  identity	   of	   the	   signer;	   it	   then	   neutrally	   applies	   rules	   to	   it	   as	   sub-­‐queries,	   and	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finally	  executes	  the	  full	  query	  against	  the	  database.	  The	  RDBMS	  of	  our	  choice	  for	  the	  SecSS	  prototype	  is	  MySQL	  5.1.	  Complementary	   to	   the	   SecSS	   server	   we	   developed	   a	   user-­‐friendly	   Ajax	  application	   that	   runs	   in	   contemporary	   Firefox	   web	   browsers.	   We	   chose	   this	  browser	   after	   carefully	   evaluating	   the	   popular	   alternatives	   because	   it	   offers	  cross-­‐platform	   performance	   according	   to	   latest	   Web	   standards	   and	   further	  provides	   built-­‐in	   (proprietary)	   cryptographic	   functionality	   –	   the	   crypto	   object	  (Anon.	  2005),	  which	  can	  be	  consumed	  trough	  JavaScript	  to	  e.g.	  digitally	  sign	  text	  using	   IETF’s	  Cryptographic	  Message	  Syntax	   (CMS)	   standard;	   comparable	   cross-­‐platform	   web	   browsers	   like	   Safari	   or	   Chrome,	   which	   both	   base	   on	   the	   Apple	  Webkit	  engine,	  do	  not	  provide	  such	  functionality.	  	  The	  Ajax	  client	  features	  two	  separate	  user	  interfaces	  –	  a	  graphical	  user	  interface	  (GUI)	  for	  point-­‐and-­‐click/drag-­‐and-­‐drop	  interaction	  and	  a	  text-­‐only	  interface	  for	  submitting	  arbitrarily	  generated	  queries.	  	  
3.1 Handling	  incoming	  requests	  The	   SecSS	   expects	   requests	   packed	   in	   a	   custom	   JSON	   structure,	   as	   shown	   in	  Table	   1.	  We	   choose	   between	   the	  well-­‐known	   standards	   XML	   and	   JSON	   for	   the	  format	  of	  messages	  exchanged	  between	  the	  client	  and	  the	  server	  and	  decided	  on	  the	  later,	  as	  the	  client	  application	  can	  easier	  generate	  and	  consume	  this	  format.	  
{ 
 SQL:  /* content of the request expressed in SQL */, 
 Pkcs7: /* Base64 encoded Pkcs7 signature of the SQL */, 
 Comment:  /* informative description of the request */ 
} 
Table	  1:	  JSON	  structure	  of	  the	  digital	  request	  The	  request	  object	  provides	  three	  fields:	  “SQL”	  contains	  the	  plaintext	  SQL	  query	  as	  either	  generated	  trough	  the	  graphical	  user	  interface	  of	  the	  client,	  or	  designed	  by	   the	   user	   herself;	   the	   “Pkcs7”	   field	   contains	   the	   Base64	   encoded	   digital	  signature	   of	   the	   SQL	   query,	   and	   the	   “Comment”	   field	   may	   contain	   additional	  natural	  language	  comments,	  which	  however	  are	  just	  informative.	  The	   subject	  making	   the	   request	   is	   free	   to	  make	  whatever	   SQL	  query	   she	   likes.	  Such	  query	  may	  consist	  of	  many	  SQL	  statements,	  which	  could	  be	  even	  malicious	  SQL	  injection	  attempts	  (cf.	  Anley	  2002)	  intended	  to	  harm	  the	  system.	  Each	  received	  request	  is	  first	  checked	  for	  its	  integrity	  and	  validity	  of	  the	  digital	  signature,	   from	   which	   we	   also	   excerpt	   the	   digital	   certificate	   of	   the	   requester.	  Based	   on	   the	   digital	   certificate	   a	   SHA-­‐256	   hash	   is	   computed	   and	   encoded	   in	  Base64,	  which	   uniquely	   identifies	   the	   subject	   internally.	   This	   unique	   identifier	  allows	  us	  to	  use	  the	  identity	  for	  ad-­‐hoc	  personalization	  of	  access	  rules.	  To	  analyze	  the	  received	  SQL	  we	  use	  the	  Gudu	  Software	  SQL	  Parser,	  a	  competent	  grammar	  parser,	  which	  allows	  us	  to	  separate	  individual	  statements,	  validate	  the	  received	  SQL	  and	  extract	  information	  about	  which	  types	  of	  queries	  (e.g.	  SELECT,	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INSERT,	  UPDATE,…)	  are	  requested	  and	  which	  relations	  and	  attributes	  are	  being	  accessed.	  The	   SecSS	   prototype	   implements	   only	   four	   frequently	   used	   statement	   types:	  SHOW,	  SELECT,	  INSERT	  and	  UPDATE.	  The	  SHOW	  query,	  which	  allows	  subjects	  to	  get	   basic	   information	   about	   the	   structure	   of	   the	   relations,	   is	   executed	  with	   no	  restrictions.	  The	  other	  three	  types	  are	  queries	  to	  which	  rules	  are	  applied	  before	  execution	  in	  form	  of	  sub-­‐queries,	  as	  described	  below.	  The	  received	  request	  is	  handled	  immediately	  and	  also	  the	  response	  is	  generated	  fully	  automated.	  Responses	   issued	  by	  SecSS	  are	   transmitted	  as	   JSON	  objects	  as	  shown	  and	  explained	  in	  Table	  4.	  
Original	  request	  (putting	  a	  child	  with	  a	  toy	  into	  the	  sandbox):	  	  
INSERT INTO sandbox (name, toy) VALUES ('Loys', 'ball'); 
 	  Rule	  (a	  child	  may	  play	  only	  with	  toys	  suitable	  to	  its	  age):	  
Remark:	  the	  rule	  imposes	  that	  the	  attributes	  toy	  and	  name	  are	  assigned	  trough	  variables	  	  @toy	  and	  @name.	  	  
	  
WHERE @toy IN  
(SELECT t.toy FROM toys t  
 WHERE t.ageLimit < (SELECT c.age FROM children c 
  WHERE c.name = @name)) 
 	  Transformed	  request:	  	  
SET @name = 'Loys'; 
SET @toy  = 'ball'; 
 
INSERT INTO sandbox (name, toy) 
SELECT @name, @toy FROM DUAL 
 WHERE @toy IN 
 (SELECT t.toy FROM toys t 
  WHERE t.ageLimit < (SELECT c.age FROM children c 
   WHERE c.name = @name)); 
Table	  2:	  Transformation	  of	  the	  INSERT	  statement	  according	  to	  stored	  rule.	  
SELECT	  When	  a	  SELECT	  query	   is	   requested,	   then	   the	  SecSS	  prototype	  verifies	  whether	  the	   subject	  has	   explicit	   permission	   to	   read	  each	  of	   the	   requested	  attributes.	   In	  case	  that	  all	  attributes	  (*)	  are	  requested,	  permission	  to	  access	  all	  attributes	  must	  be	   explicitly	   granted.	  The	   request	   is	  denied	   if	   for	   at	   least	   one	  of	   the	   requested	  attributes	  no	  read-­‐access	  has	  been	  granted.	  Usually,	   access	   to	   attributes	   will	   be	   granted	   conditionally.	   Thus	   for	   example,	  information	  about	  employees	  of	  a	  state	  organization	  may	  be	  given	  only	  for	  full-­‐time	  employees.	  Such	  condition	  will	  present	  a	  rule	  expressed	  as	  a	  sub-­‐query	  and	  will	  be	  applied	  whenever	  read	  access	  to	  any	  field	  of	  the	  relation	  containing	  the	  requested	  data	  is	  performed.	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If	  the	  request	  is	  conditional,	  thus	  if	  it	  contains	  a	  WHERE	  clause,	  then	  such	  clause	  is	  isolated	  using	  parentheses	  for	  security	  reasons.	  
INSERT	  The	   same	   as	   when	   read	   access	   is	   requested,	   we	   first	   check	   at	   the	   INSERT	  statement	  if	  write	  access	  to	  the	  particular	  attributes	  has	  been	  granted.	  We	  then	  extract	   each	   attribute	   to	   which	   a	   value	   is	   being	   assigned	   and	   define	   it	   as	   a	  variable.	  The	   INSERT	  statement	   is	   fully	   reconstructed.	   If	   the	   rules	   impose	   filtering,	   then	  the	  request	  is	  executed	  against	  a	  virtual	  (DUAL)	  relation,	  as	  shown	  in	  Table	  2.	  
UPDATE	  Also	   in	   UPDATE	   queries	   SecSS	   first	   checks	   if	   apropriate	   permissions	   for	   the	  requester	   exist.	   The	   logic	   for	   transforming	   statements	   is	   similar	   to	   the	   one	  applied	   for	   INSERT	   statements.	   Table	   3	   shows	   how	   an	   UPDATE	   request	   is	  transformed	  according	  to	  the	  rules.	  Eventually	   it	  may	  happen	  that	  values	   in	   the	  UPDATE	  statement	  are	   themselves	  results	   of	   nested	   queries	   instead	   of	   fixed	   values.	   Table	   5	   shows	   how	   SecSS	  handles	  such	  situation.	  
Original	  request	  (giving	  a	  child	  another	  toy):	  	  
UPDATE sandbox SET toy = 'squirrel' 
 WHERE name = 'Loys'; 
 	  Rules	  (a	  child	  may	  play	  only	  with	  a	  (1)	  toy	  suiting	  its	  age,	  (2)	  which	  is	  not	  occupied):	  
Remark:	  the	  first	  rule	  requires	  attributes	  toy	  and	  name	  to	  be	  assigned	  trough	  variables	  @toy	  and	  @name;	  the	  second	  
rule	  requires	  the	  existence	  of	  variable	  @toy,	  which	  is	  the	  same	  as	  the	  previous.	  
	  
WHERE @toy IN  
(SELECT t.toy FROM toys t  
 WHERE t.ageLimit < (SELECT c.age FROM children c 
  WHERE c.name = @name)) 
 
WHERE @toy NOT IN 
(SELECT s.toy FROM sandbox s) 
 	  Result	  of	  transformation:	  	  
SET @name = 'Loys'; 
SET @toy  = 'squirrel'; 
 
UPDATE sandbox SET toy = @toy WHERE (name = @name) 
AND @toy IN 
 (SELECT t.toy FROM toys t 
  WHERE t.ageLimit < (SELECT c.age FROM children c 
   WHERE c.name = @name)); 
AND @toy NOT IN 
 (SELECT s.toy FROM sandbox s) 
Table	  3:	  Transforming	  the	  UPDATE	  query.	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3.1 The	  Electronic	  Legal	  Act	  Rules	  are	  stored	  in	  Electronic	  Legal	  Acts	  (ELAs),	  a	  special	  XML-­‐based	  document	  format	   developed	   for	   the	   requirements	   of	   the	   SecSS.	   The	   ELAs	   are	   publicly	  readable	  documents,	  issued	  and	  signed	  by	  the	  responsible	  public	  official,	  which	  contain	  rules	  of	  access	  to	  data	  stored	  on	  the	  particular	  server.	  The	  publicness	  of	  the	  ELAs	   is	   essential	   as	   it	   allows	  everybody	   to	  examine	   the	   rules	   that	  apply	   to	  her	  and	  act	  accordingly.	  	  The	  XML	  schema	  of	  ELAs	   is	   shown	   in	  Figure	  4	  and	  Figure	  5.	  The	   root	  element	  (Configuration)	   provides	   the	   elements	  Connection,	  Restrictions	  and	  Permissions.	  The	   Connection	   element	   is	   provided	   to	   hold	   the	   full	   connection	   string	   to	  accessing	  the	  database,	  however	  it	  is	  not	  used	  in	  the	  prototype.	  Restrictions	   for	   accessing	   individual	   attributes	   (hereinafter:	   fields)	   are	   stored	  inside	  the	  element	  Restrictions	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  Restriction	  elements	  (cf.	  Figure	  4).	  Each	  restriction	  has	   its	  unique	   ID	   (attribute	  @Id),	  which	   is	  used	   to	  address	  the	   restrictions	   from	   inside	   rules	   that	   regulate	   access	   to	   individual	   fields.	   The	  attribute	  @type	   defines	  at	  which	   request	   the	   restriction	  should	  be	  applied;	   the	  prototype	  supports	  two	  different	  types	  of	  request:	  SELECT	  and	  INSERT/UPDATE.	  Thus,	   a	   restriction	   of	   type	   “SELECT”	   shall	   be	   applied	   only	  when	   read	   access	   is	  requested.	  
{ 
 Results:   /* collection of resulting relations */ 
 [{ 
  ExecutedSQL: /* transformed statement */, 
  RequestedSQL: /* original SQL statement */, 
  Rows:   /* collection of returned rows */ 
  [{ 
   Name:  /* attribute name */, 
   Value: /* attribute value */ 
  }] 
 }] 
 Feedback:  /* auto-generated feedback */, 
 GenerationDate: /* date and time of the response */, 
 OK:    /* success? (true/false) */ 
} 
Table	  4:	  JSON	  structure	  of	  the	  response	  Restrictions	   are	   applied	   in	   form	   of	   sub-­‐queries,	   as	   described	   in	   the	   previous	  chapter.	  The	  sub-­‐query	  defines	  a	  subset	  of	  data,	  a	  virtual	  relation,	  over	  which	  the	  requested	  query	  is	  executed.	  The	  attributes	  @field	  and	  @use	  define	  how	  the	  sub-­‐query	  should	  be	  integrated	  into	  the	  final	  query:	  @field	  defines,	  which	  value	  shall	  be	  searched-­‐for	  in	  the	  result	  of	  the	  sub-­‐query	  and	  @use	  determines	  the	  method	  for	   search,	   whereby	   “IN”	   and	   “NOT	   IN”	   are	   supported.	   Table	   2	   shows	   how	   an	  incoming	  request	  is	  transformed	  according	  to	  rule	  #suitableAge	  from	  Figure	  4.	  Rules	  may	  require	  that	  certain	  fields	  or	  variables	  be	  addressed	  in	  the	  request.	  In	  such	  case	  (cf.	  Figure	  4)	  rules	  contain	  elements	  var	   in	  which	  the	  variable	  names	  and	  addressed	   fields	   are	  defined.	   In	   the	   example	   from	  Table	  2	   the	   fields	  name	  and	   toy	  have	   been	   assigned	   the	   values	   “Loys”	   and	   “ball”	   and	   both	   values	   are	  “captured”	   by	   the	   provided	   variables	   @name	   and	   @toy,	   which	   are	   later	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addressed	   from	   within	   the	   sub-­‐query,	   e.g.:	   WHERE	   c.name	   =	   @name.	   These	  required	  variables	  enable	  rules	  to	  be	  context-­‐aware.	  The	   element	   Permissions	   hierarchically	   structures	   information	   to	   what	   fields	  access-­‐permissions	   have	   been	   defined.	   The	   ELA	   generally	   regulates	   access	   for	  the	   entire	   endpoint	   (one	   RDBMS),	   which	   may	   contain	   multiple	   schemas.	  
Permissions	  therefore	  supports	  many	  Schema	  elements,	  each	  Schema	  can	  contain	  many	   Tables	   and	   each	   Table	   many	   Fields.	   Access	   permissions	   have	   to	   be	  explicitly	  regulated	  on	  the	  level	  of	  individual	  fields	  –	  the	  rationale	  of	  this	  design	  is	   to	   force	  ELA	  designers	   to	   think	   about	   every	   single	   field	   to	  which	   they	   grant	  access.	  
Original	  request	  (child	  with	  the	  identifier	  1008984500000	  receives	  toy	  #15):	  	  
UPDATE sandbox s LEFT JOIN children c ON s.name = c.name 
SET s.toy =  
 (SELECT t.toy FROM toychest t WHERE t.id = '15')  
WHERE c.emšo = '1008984500000'; 
 	  Transformation	  result:	  
Remark:	  the	  rules	  impose	  the	  variables	  @toy	  and	  @name,	  which	  provide	  values	  for	  the	  attributes	  sandbox.toy	  and	  
sandbox.name;	  the	  requester	  however	  provides	  only	  a	  value	  for	  sandbox.toy.	  	  	  
SET @name = (SELECT c.name FROM children c  
   WHERE c.emšo = '1008984500000'); 
SET @toy  = (SELECT t.toy FROM toychest t WHERE t.id = '15'); 
 
UPDATE sandbox s LEFT JOIN children c ON s.name = c.name 
SET s.toy = @toy 
WHERE (c.emšo = '1008984500000') 
AND @toy IN 
 (SELECT t.toy FROM toys t 
  WHERE t.ageLimit < (SELECT c.age FROM children c 
   WHERE c.name = @name)); 
AND @toy NOT IN 
 (SELECT s.toy FROM sandbox s) 
Table	  5:	  Resolving	  undefined	  variables	  in	  UPDATE	  statements	  Each	   field	   can	   contain	  multiple	   permissions	   (Permission)	   and	   each	   permission	  has	   the	   mandatory	   attribute	   @user,	   which	   defines	   to	   which	   requester	   the	  containing	   rules	   have	   to	   be	   applied.	   To	   regulate	  permissions	   for	   public	   access,	  the	  value	  of	  @user	  is	  “anon”.	  In	   the	   prototype,	   user	   management	   is	   static,	   i.e.	   the	   users	   to	   which	   special	  regulations	  apply	  are	  explicitly	  defined	  in	  the	  ELA.	  However,	  a	  dynamic	  solution	  would	  be	  imaginable,	  where	  the	  identity	  identifier	  would	  be	  the	  result	  of	  a	  prior	  SQL	  query	  –	  in	  such	  case	  restricting	  access	  to	  a	  position	  (e.g.	  prime	  minister)	  or	  membership	   to	   a	   group	   (e.g.	   police	   force,	   faculty	   staff,	   voting	   body)	   would	   be	  imaginable.	  A	   further	  not	  yet	  realized	  option	  would	  be	   to	   implement	  a	   “global”	  SQL	  variable	  @sx_identity	  that	  would	  expose	  the	  identity	  of	  the	  requester	  to	  the	  sub-­‐queries	  containing	  the	  rules;	  better	  context-­‐awareness	  could	  be	  achieved	  by	  exposing	  further	  global	  variables	  providing	  e.g.	  the	  IP	  address.	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Particular	   permissions	   can	   be	   restricted	   trough	   rules,	   which	   SecSS	   applies	   in	  form	   of	   sub-­‐queries.	   These	   restrictions	   are	   applied	   by	   defining	   a	   series	   of	  
Apply-­‐Restriction	   elements,	   which	   refer	   to	   the	   particular	   rules	   using	   the	  @ref	  element	  referring	  to	  the	  @Id	  of	  the	  rule.	  The	  defined	  restrictions	  are	  applied	  in	  their	  numerical	  order.	  	  
3.2 Summary:	  effective	  personalized	  regulation	  trough	  sub-­‐queries	  The	  main	   focus	   of	   SecSS	   is	   on	   sub-­‐queries	   trough	  which	   read/write	   access	   to	  data	   needed	   for	   governance	   is	   regulated.	   The	   dynamic	   sub-­‐queries	   as	   used	   by	  SecSS	   represent	   context-­‐aware	   rules	   that	   are	   applied	   cumulatively	   to	   an	  incoming	  request,	  thus	  presenting	  the	  requester	  a	  set	  of	  virtual	  relations	  of	  data	  to	  which	  she	  has	  the	  desired	  access.	  In	  this	  way	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  create	  a	  dynamic	  set	  of	  rules,	  which	  adopt	  themselves	  to	  the	  situation	  on	  run-­‐time.	  Personalized	  regulation	  of	  access	  to	  data	  in	  modern	  praxis	  is	  usually	  done	  trough	  workflow-­‐based	   business	   logic,	   which	   has	   been	   defined	   at	   design-­‐time	   of	   the	  application;	   this	  way	   a	   very	   fine-­‐grained	   and	   performance-­‐effective	   regulation	  mechanism	   can	   be	   designed,	   however	   any	   change	   of	   rules	   or	   underlying	   data	  structure	   requires	   a	   redesign	   of	   the	   business	   logic	   itself,	   which	   might	   be	  questionable	  from	  the	  legal	  perspective	  (cf.	  Paulin	  2012).	  Another	   way	   to	   personalize	   access	   to	   data	   in	   relational	   databases	   has	   been	  patented	   by	   Garrison	   (1998),	   who	   describes	   a	   method	   to	   regulate	   access	   to	  individual	   fields/rows.	  His	   concept	   requires	   a	   “security	   data	   table”	   that	  would	  contain	   particular	   information	   about	  which	   user	   has	   access	   to	  which	   fields.	   In	  our	   opinion	   however,	   this	   approach	   would	   result	   in	   an	   exorbitantly	   large	  metadata	  table	  with	  questionable	  added	  value.	  The	  approach	   implemented	  by	  SecSS	  relies	  on	  relational	  algebra.	  An	   important	  strength	  of	  the	  described	  method	  lies	  in	  the	  opportunity	  to	  regulate	  personalized	  access	  for	  a-­‐priory	  unknown	  users	  without	  storing	  any	  information	  about	  them.	  Neither	   the	   identity	  of	   the	  user,	  nor	   the	  exact	   subset	  of	  data	   to	  which	   the	  user	  requests	  read	  or	  write	  access	  can	  be	  predicted	  in	  advance,	  nonetheless	  SecSS	  is	  able	  to	  effectively	  regulate	  in	  accordance	  to	  given	  rules.	  Absolute	  flexibility	  in	  regulation	  satisfies	  the	  ss-­‐Gov	  requirements	  #4	  (arbitrary	  requests	   in	  standardized	   language)	  and	  #6	  (access	  to	  core	  data	   limited	  only	  by	  law).	  SecSS	  further	  satisfies	  the	  ss-­‐Gov	  requirement	  #2,	  which	  demands	  that	  the	  format	  of	  exchanged	  messages	  is	  to	  be	  legally	  defined,	  as	  well	  as	  requirement	  #3	  that	  demands	  a	   legally	  definable	  procedure	  how	  messages	  will	  be	  handled;	   the	  later	   requirement	   is	   achieved	   by	   separating	   the	   definition	   of	   rules	   from	   the	  business	   logic,	  which’	  code	  therefore	  can	  be	  politically	  approved	  and	  published	  in	  the	  same	  way	  as	  legislation	  and	  remain	  unchanged	  for	  generations.	  
4 Proof-­‐of-­‐concept:	  the	  sandbox	  In	   order	   to	   evaluate	   the	   SecSS,	   we	   chose	   the	   scenario	   of	   a	   sandbox	   –	   both	   a	  popular	  term	  from	  computing	  as	  well	  as	  a	  complex	  world	  of	  legal	  relations	  in	  the	  reality.	   The	   sandbox	   from	   our	   scenario	   is	   centered	   inside	   a	   playground	   and	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presents	  a	  geographically	  controllable	  area	  of	  screen	  pixels	  inside	  which	  virtual	  children	  can	  play	  with	  their	  virtual	  toys.	  The	   playground	   is	   a	   schema	   containing	   three	   relations:	   children,	   sandbox	   and	  
toychest,	  as	  shown	  in	  Figure	  2.	  This	  virtual	  habitat	  resembles	  a	  real	  society	  –	   it	  contains	   subjects	   (the	   children),	   which	   inhabit	   a	   territory	   (the	   sandbox)	   and	  have	  relations	  to	  objects	  (the	  toys).	  Children	  can	  be	  placed	  in	  and	  removed	  from	  the	  sandbox	  and	  they	  can	  receive/give	  back	  toys	  into	  the	  toy-­‐chest.	  All	  relations	  among	   the	   subjects	   and	   objects	   in	   the	   playground	   are	   defined	   as	   data	   in	   the	  database	  and	  every	  change	  of	  them	  is	  stored.	  
The	  rules	  As	  it	  is	  in	  any	  real	  society,	  also	  the	  playground	  knows	  certain	  rules	  that	  regulate	  the	   interaction.	  The	   rules	   that	   apply	   to	   the	  playground	  protect	   the	   interests	  of	  the	   children,	   namely	   their	   right	   to	   data	   privacy	   and	   possession	   of	   goods.	   The	  rules	  are	  as	  follows:	  1. Everybody	  can	  read	  any	  data	  with	  exception	  of	  the	  dates	  of	  birth	  of	  the	  children,	  which	  are	  protected	  personal	  data.	  2. A	  toy	  that	  is	  already	  in	  use	  must	  not	  be	  given	  to	  any	  other	  child.	  3. Everybody	  may	  give	  any	  child	  a	  toy	  to	  play	  with;	  however	  the	  children	  can	  receive	  only	  toys	  for	  which	  they	  are	  old	  enough.	  4. Everybody	  may	  place	  a	  new	  toy	  into	  the	  toy-­‐chest.	  5. Everybody	  may	  place	  a	  child	  into	  the	  sandbox.	  6. Everybody	  may	  move	  a	  child	  to	  another	  location	  in	  the	  playground.	  Rules	  #1	  and	  #4-­‐6	  are	  simple	  rules	  that	  can	  be	  expressed	  by	  setting	  permissions	  for	  read	  and/or	  write	  access	  for	  the	  respective	  fields.	  Rules	  #2	  and	  #3	  however	  are	   complex	  and	  must	  be	  handled	  by	  defining	   sub-­‐queries.	   Figure	  6	   shows	   the	  ELA	  for	  the	  playground.	  
	  


































T1 - naziv igrače
T2 - URI do slike igrače
T3 - primerna starost
T4 - identiteta “lastnika” igrače
C1 - ime otroka
C2 - priimek otroka
S3 - X-pozicija v peskovniku
S4 - Y-pozicija v peskovniku
CS - EMŠO otroka
TS - ID igrače
C3 - datum rojstva otroka
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Rules	  #4	  &	  #5	  for	  example	  would	  be	  realized	  by	  giving	  the	  user	  “anon”	  INSERT	  permission	   to	   the	   fields	   toychest.{name,	   image,	   suitable4age}	   (the	   field	  
toychest.item	  increments	  automatically),	  and	  the	  same	  to	  the	  fields	  sandbox.{ninu,	  
item,	  posx,	  posy}.	  The	   rules	   #2	   and	   #3	   can	   be	   solved	   using	   the	   restrictions	   #toyInUse	   and	  
#suitableAge,	   as	   shown	   bolded	   in	   Figure	   6.	   Table	   2,	   Table	   3	   and	   Table	   5	  demonstrate	   slightly	   simplified	   how	   these	   rules	  would	   be	   applied	   to	   incoming	  requests.	  Especially	   complex	   is	   rule	  #3,	  which	   requires	   that	   children	   can	  play	   only	  with	  toys	  that	  are	  fit	  for	  their	  age;	  each	  toy	  namely	  has	  an	  age	  restriction	  and	  children	  who	  are	  younger	  than	  the	  required	  age	  must	  not	  use	  it.	  However	  a	  child	  that	  is	  too	  young	  to	  play	  with	  a	  toy	  today	  might	  be	  old	  enough	  to	  play	  with	  it	  tomorrow	  –	  the	  rule	  therefore	  must	  be	  aware	  of	  the	  temporal	  context.	  Furthermore,	  rule	  #1	  restricts	  anybody	  from	  knowing	  the	  age	  of	  the	  children,	  as	  it	  mandates	  the	  birth	  dates	  to	  be	  protected;	  it	  is	  hence	  impossible	  to	  know	  in	  advance	  if	  the	  child	  will	  successfully	  receive	  the	  toy	  we	  want	  to	  give	  it.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  SecSS	  must	  enforce	  all	  rules.	  In	  order	  to	  cope	  with	  rule	  #3,	  the	  sub-­‐query	   from	   the	   restriction	   first	   ad-­‐hoc	   calculates	   the	   current	   age	   of	   the	  selected	   child	   using	   available	   functions	   for	   time	   calculations	   provided	   by	   the	  MySQL	  RDBMS,	  as	  shown	  in	  the	  SQL	  statement	  below.	  	  
• SELECT YEAR(FROM_DAYS(DATEDIFF(NOW(), DATE(@bday))) Using	   this	   technique,	   the	   age	   of	   a	   child	   can	   be	   correctly	   taken	   into	   account	  without	  revealing	  it	  to	  the	  requester.	  	  Table	   5	   shows	   a	   further	   complicated	   example	   where	   a	   toy	   is	   given	   to	   a	   child	  without	  the	  user	  knowing	  the	  relevant	  data	  needed	  to	  make	  the	  desired	  change.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  information	  to	  be	  updated	  is	  calculated	  at	  run-­‐time	  and	  although	  only	  the	  IDs	  of	  the	  child	  and	  toy	  are	  provided	  (instead	  of	  the	  names	  of	  each,	  as	  required	  by	  that	  simplified	  example),	  the	  update	  performs	  correctly.	  
The	  user	  interface	  An	   important	   stakeholder	  group	  of	   ss-­‐Gov	  are	   service-­‐providers,	  who	   facilitate	  the	   interaction	   with	   ss-­‐Gov	   registries	   by	   providing	   graphical	   user	   interfaces	  and/or	   other	   means	   of	   user-­‐friendly	   interaction	   (Paulin	   2012,	   2.2.3).	   An	  instantiation	   of	   such	   service	   in	   form	   of	   an	   Ajax	   web	   application	   providing	   a	  graphical	   and	   textual	  user	   interface	  has	  been	  developed	  complementary	   to	   the	  SecSS	  prototype.	  The	  textual	  user	  interface	  (shown	  in	  Figure	  8)	  allows	  users	  to	  design	  and	  submit	  arbitrary	  SQL	  queries	  to	  the	  SecSS,	  and	  visualizes	  the	  responded	  results	  in	  tables.	  The	  design	   for	   this	  user	   interface	  has	  been	   inspired	  by	  modern	  visual	   tools	   for	  interaction	  with	  database	  management	  systems,	  like	  e.g.	  the	  MySQL	  Workbench.	  A	   more	   advanced	   way	   of	   interaction	   is	   possible	   trough	   the	   graphical	   user	  interface	   (Figure	   3),	   which	   provides	   an	   intuitive	   drag-­‐and-­‐drop	   experience.	   In	  this	  mode,	  the	  sandbox,	  children	  and	  individual	  toys	  are	  visualized	  and	  the	  GUI	  allows	  children	  to	  be	  dropped	  into,	  dragged	  out	  of,	  or	  moved	  inside	  the	  sandbox;	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also	  the	  toys	  can	  be	  dragged	  onto	  children.	  After	  each	  action,	  the	  corresponding	  SQL	  is	  generated	  and	  presented	  to	  the	  user	  for	  signing.	  The	  signed	  SQL	  is	  packed	  in	  the	  appropriate	  format	  and	  sent	  to	  the	  SecSS;	  in	  case	  of	  a	  negative	  response,	  the	  performed	  action	  is	  reversed.	  	  
	  
Figure	  3:	  Graphical	  user	  interface	  for	  manipulating	  the	  playground	  The	  communication	  between	   the	  Ajax	   client	  and	   the	  SecSS	  uses	   the	   formats	  as	  described	  in	  chapter	  3.	  Each	  SQL	  query	  created	  directly	  or	  indirectly	  by	  the	  user	  is	  presented	   for	  signing	  using	   the	  built-­‐in	   functionality	  provided	  by	   the	  Firefox	  web	   browser.	   Firefox	   presents	   the	   user	   an	   intuitive	   “what	   you	   see	   is	  what	   you	  
sign”	  dialog,	  which	  allows	  the	  user	  to	  view	  the	  SQL	  prior	   to	  signing	   it;	   the	  user	  then	   chooses	   the	   desired	   digital	   certificate	   and	   unlocks	   the	   corresponding	  private	  key	  using	  its	  password.	  The	  demonstrated	  client	  application	  proves	  that	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  interact	  with	  ss-­‐Gov	   registries	   in	   a	   user-­‐friendly	  way	  without	   compromising	   the	   requirements	  imposed	  by	  the	  ss-­‐Gov	  governance	  model.	  
5 Conclusion	  In	  the	  present	  article	  we	  demonstrated	  a	  prototype	  instance	  for	  a	  ss-­‐Gov	  registry	  that	  complies	  with	  the	  six	  ss-­‐Gov	  requirements	  as	  defined	  in	  (Paulin	  2012).	  We	  proposed	  that	  data	  based	  on	  which	  eligibilities	  are	  calculated	  and	  governance	  is	  performed	  can	  be	  effectively	  stored	  in	  relational	  databases	  to	  which	  self-­‐service	  read	  and	  write	  access	  is	  regulated	  using	  relational	  algebra	  and	  the	  SQL	  standard.	  SS-­‐Gov	   further	   defines	   several	   stakeholders	   that	   impose	   needs	   that	   must	   be	  fulfilled	  by	  any	  ss-­‐Gov	  registry	  instance.	  The	  demonstrated	  SecSS	  prototype,	  the	  complementary	  prototype	  visual	  client	  application	  and	  the	  ELA	  document	  format	  demonstrate	   how	   the	   stakeholder	   requirements	   can	  be	   satisfied	  using	  modern	  
A.	  Paulin,	  2012	  (alois@apaulin.com)	   Secure	  SQL	  Server	  
16	  
technology.	   We	   evaluated	   the	   presented	   technologies	   using	   a	   scenario	   of	  regulating	   legal	   relations	   in	  a	   children’s	  playground.	  We	  defined	  six	   real-­‐world	  rules	  that	  apply	  to	  this	  scenario	  and	  successfully	  demonstrated	  how	  they	  can	  be	  enforced	  using	  SecSS.	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Figure	  4:	  Electronic	  rules	  inside	  the	  element	  Restriction	  of	  an	  ELA	  
	  
Figure	  5:	  Managing	  read/write	  access	  to	  the	  field	  sandbox.toy	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Figure	  6:	  Rules	  for	  the	  "Playground"	  scenario	  stored	  in	  the	  ELA	  
<?xml version="1.0" encoding="utf-8" ?> 
<Configuration> 
   <Connections></Connection> 
   <Restrictions> 
 <Restriction  
  Id="toyInUse" type="INSERT/UPDATE" 
  table="sandbox" field="@item" use="NOT IN"> 
  <var field="item" name="@item" /> 
  <sql> 
  <![CDATA[ 
   SELECT s.item FROM playground.sandbox s 
  ]]> 
  </sql> 
  <justification> 
   A toy that is in use by a child must not be 
   given to another child. 
  </justification> 
 </Restriction> 
 <Restriction 
  Id="suitableAge" type="INSERT/UPDATE"  
  table="sandbox" field="@item" use="IN"> 
  <var field="ninu" name="@ninu" /> 
  <var field="item" name="@item" /> 
  <sql> 
  <![CDATA[ 
   SELECT t.item FROM playground.toychest t  
   WHERE t.suitable4age <=  
      (SELECT YEAR(FROM_DAYS( 
    DATEDIFF(NOW(), DATE(c.birthday))))  
       FROM playground.children c  
       WHERE c.ninu = @ninu) 
  ]]> 
  </sql> 
  <justification> 
   A child can only play with toys for which 
   it is old enough. 
  </justification> 
 </Restriction> 
   </Restrictions> 
   <Permissions> 
 <Schema name="playground"> 
    <Table name="sandbox"> 
  <Field name="ninu"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="INSERT" /> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="item"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="INSERT"> 
   <Apply-Restriction ref="#suitableAge" /> 
     </Permission> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="UPDATE"> 
   <Apply-Restriction ref="#suitableAge" /> 
     </Permission> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="posx"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
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     <Permission user="anon" type="INSERT" /> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="UPDATE" /> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="posy"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="INSERT" /> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="UPDATE" /> 
  </Field> 
    </Table> 
    <Table name="children"> 
  <Field name="ninu"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="name"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="surname"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
  </Field> 
    </Table> 
    <Table name="toychest"> 
  <Field name="*"> 
     <Permission user="@owner" type="DELETE"> 
     <!-- the "@" sign before the field name indicates  
     that the identity is stored in the  
     corresponding field --> 
     <justification> 
   The “owner” of a toy may remove the toy from 
   the toy-chest. The database must feature a 
   correctly set FK-constraint to prevent removing 
   a toy that is in use. 
     </justification> 
     </Permission> 
     <Permission user="###(admin)###" type="UPDATE" /> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="item"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="name"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="INSERT" /> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="image"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="INSERT" /> 
  </Field> 
  <Field name="suitable4age"> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="SELECT" /> 
     <Permission user="anon" type="INSERT" /> 
  </Field> 
    </Table> 
 </Schema> 
   </Permissions> 
</Configuration> 	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Figure	  7:	  The	  SQL	  as	  it	  has	  been	  transformed	  and	  executed	  is	  presented	  after	  a	  successful	  
transaction.	  
	  
Figure	  8:	  The	  SecSS	  prototype	  client	  allows	  also	  text-­‐based	  access	  to	  data	  
